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Squeeze Blood From Turnip@:
Abusing Trademark Law's Morality
Provision in the TTAB
Cathay Y. N. Smith
ABSTRACT
Trademark law prohibits the registration of trademarks that are immoral or scandalous.
This "Morality Provision"in trademark law has been criticized as being an unconstitutional
abridgement of free speech and resulting in inconsistency and other problems at the
USPTO examination stage. This essay exposes another problem with the Morality
Provision, which is its abuse by third parties in the TTAB. This essay explores why the
Morality Provision-and not any other provisions in trademark law-is susceptible to
this type of abuse and outlines examples of these abusive cases in the TTAB. These
cases show that, in inter partes proceedings in the TTAB, the Morality Provision is often
asserted by individuals without any real interest in the proposed trademark, but who
instead morally disapprove of the trademark owner or its commercial activities. This type
of behavior, where third parties use trademark law and the TTAB to direct their moral
outrage at individuals or businesses ofwhich they disapprove, overextends trademark law's
jurisprudence, disrupts commerce, and inappropriately drains government resources. Yet
as long as the Morality Provision is part of trademark law in the U.S., these cases continue
to appear in the TTAB and result in years of contentious and unnecessary litigation. The
tendency and ease for the Morality Provision to be abused in this way combined with its
potential to violate free speech and its other problems at he USPTO examination stage
supports the argument that the Morality Provision is flawed and should be overhauled
or removed from trademark law.
AUTHOR
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INTRODUCTION
Today, a consumer can eat a Kickass Cupcake, drink a glass of Fat Bastard
wine, and sit in front of a Big Ass Fan while fishing with a rod from Master
Bait & Tackle.' In our competitive market, businesses are getting creative with
their branding in order to attract consumers and distinguish their goods and
services from competitors. Many of these businesses would be surprised to find,
however, that in spite of their brand recognition and market success, they may
not be able to register their trademarks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO). Regardless of how famous a trademark has become, as of
now, Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act explicitly prohibits the registration of a
trademark that "[cjonsists of or comprises immoral . . . or scandalous matter"
(hereinafter, the "Morality Provision"), and third parties have a right to oppose a
trademark application or cancel a registration if they believe the trademark is
immoral or scandalous.
The Federal Circuit is currently considering whether the Morality
Provision is an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech in the pending case,
In re Brunetti.3 On the eve of the Federal Circuit's decision, this essay discusses
an overlooked and under-discussed problem with the Morality Provision-its
susceptibility for abuse by third parties in the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board (TTAB). Specifically, this Essay exposes the ways in which third parties
abuse the Morality Provision in the TTAB, examines why the Morality
Provision-and not other provisions in trademark law-is more susceptible to
this type of abuse, and outlines examples of these cases in the TTAB. These
cases show that in inter partes proceedings in the TTAB, the Morality Provision
is often asserted by individuals without any real interest in the proposed
trademark, but who instead morally disapprove of the trademark owner or its
commercial activities. This type of behavior, in which third parties use
trademark law and the TTAB to punish businesses of which they morally
disapprove, overextends trademark law's jurisprudence, disrupts commerce, and
inappropriately burdens government resources. Yet, as long as the Morality
Provision is part of trademark law in the United States, these cases continue to
1. John Grossman, Risu( Names Reap Rewards for Some Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.con/2014/04/24/business/smallbusiness/risque-names-reap-rewards-for-
some-companies.html? r=0.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
3. See No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. argued Aug. 29, 2017).
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appear in front of the TTAB and sometimes result in years of contentious and
expensive litigation. The tendency and ease for the Morality Provision to be
abused in this way combined with its potential to violate free speech' and its
problems at the USPTO examination stage' supports the argument that the
Morality Provision is flawed and should be overhauled or removed from
trademark law.
I. THE MORALITY PROVISION IN THE TTAB
The Morality Provision is codified in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. 1052(a). Once a party files a trademark application in the USPTO, the
application goes through the USPTO examination phase, during which a
trademark examiner employed by the USPTO determines whether the
proposed trademark meets the requirements set forth in Section 2 of the
Trademark Act. These requirements include that the proposed trademark is not
confusingly similar to another registered trademark, that the trademark is
not merely descriptive, and that the trademark does not consist of or comprise
immoral or scandalous matter.' Once the USPTO approves a trademark
application it will publish the trademark for opposition. At that time, anyone
who believes it will be damaged by the registration of the trademark may file a
notice of opposition to initiate an inter partes proceeding in the TTAB to
oppose the application based on the grounds set forth in Section 2.' If the
trademark is already registered, anyone who believes it will be damaged by the
4. This is the issue on appeal in In re Brunetti. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court recently
decided the same issue in regards to trademark law's disparagement provision, in which the
Court found the disparagement provision violated the First Amendment by discriminating
against certain speech. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
5. The Morality Provision's numerous problems at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) examination stage have been explored in other papers, including Jasmine Abdel-
khalik, To Live in In-'Fame"-y: Reconceiving Scandalous Marks as Analogous to Famous Marks, 25
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 173 (2007); Megan M. Carpenter & Kathryn T. Murphy,
Calling Bulls**t on the LanhamAct: The 2(a) Barfor Immoral, Scandalous, and Disparaging Marks,
49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 465 (2011); Anne Gilson LaLonde &Jerome Gilson, Trademarks
Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476 (2011);
and, Regan Smith, Note, Trademark Lazo and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous and
Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 451 (2007).
6. Section 2(d) prohibits confusingly similar trademarks, section 2(e) prohibits merely descriptive
trademarks, and section 2(a) prohibits immoral or scandalous content. 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
Section 2 includes other requirements, such as prohibiting trademarks that consist of the flag or
coat of arms of the United States, a name or portrait of a living individual without consent, or
deceptive matter, etc. Id.
7. U.S. PATENT &TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL
OF PROCEDURE § 102.02 (June rev. 2017).
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continued registration of the trademark may file a petition in the TTAB to cancel
the trademark registration. A third party may initiate an action in the TTAB
to cancel an immoral or scandalous trademark under Section 2(a)'s Morality
Provision at any time regardless of how long that trademark has been registered
in the USPTO.
Case law on the Morality Provision has historically treated the words
"immoral" and "scandalous" as being synonymous.) According to the Federal
Circuit, for a mark to be considered immoral or scandalous, it must be
"shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or propriety; disgraceful; offensive;
disreputable; . . . giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings; . . . [or]
calling out [for] condemnation."0 This demonstration must be made "in the
context of contemporary attitudes" and "from the standpoint of not necessarily
a majority, but a substantial composite of the general public."" The TTAB has
recognized that these standards are "somewhat vague," and that deciding
whether a mark is immoral or scandalous is a "highly subjective" activity.2
What is not vague, however, is the requirement that a claim to oppose a
trademark application or cancel a trademark registration under the Morality
Provision pertain only to trademarks that are scandalous or immoral. Trademark
law does not regulate the goods or services a trademark owner offers even if
those goods or services may be viewed as scandalous or immoral, as is the case
with pornographic magazines. In this specific example, the TTAB explained:
[T]he question of whether or not the contents of the magazine may
be pornographic in nature is not an issue to be decided by [the]
Board. If such were the criterion, many well-known magazines with
inoffensive or arbitrary titles might well have been precluded
registration in the Patent Office.'3
Trademark law does not regulate the morality of businesses or services
that a trademark owner offers, but rather the proposed trademark itself.
Nonetheless, as illustrated in the cases below, the Morality Provision is often
asserted by third parties opposing applications or petitioning to cancel
8. Id.
9. In re Manwin/RK Collateral Trust, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1311, 1312 n.3 (T.T.A.B. 2014) ("[T]he
terms 'immoral' and 'scandalous' are typically discussed as though basically synonymous.... ).
10. In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (alterations in original)
(quoting In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327, 328 (C.C.P.A. 1938)), abrogated by In re
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
11. Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1371 (first quoting In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216,
1219 (T.T.A.B. 993); then quoting In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485 (C.C.P.A 1981)).
12. In re Hershey, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1470,1471 (T.T.A.B. 1988).
13. In re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. 334, 335 (T.T.A.B. 1973).
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registrations in the USPTO because those third parties morally disapprove of
the trademark owner or its goods or services, as opposed to the trademark itself.
In spite of the obvious attempts to overextend trademark law's jurisprudence
and the TTAB's authority, many of these cases have resulted in years of
litigation and appeals, and in some instances even the ultimate abandonment of
valid trademark rights.
II. EXAMPLES OF ABUSIVE CASES IN THE TTAB
Over the past twenty years, a number of individuals have filed
oppositions or petitions in the TTAB that highlight the potential for abuse of
the Morality Provision. One of the first cases involving this type of abuse in the
TTAB was Ritchie v. Simpson.14 Orenthal James Simpson, commonly known
as O.J. Simpson or the "Juice,"" was a successful NFL player who began
appearing as a small-time actor in movies and as a sports commentator after
retiring from football in 1979.6 On June 12, 1994, the police found Simpson's
ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her lover stabbed to death outside of
Brown's California home." Five days later, the police arrested Simpson and
charged him with their murders, leading to one of the most infamous criminal
trials in American history." About a month after his wife's murder, O.J.
Simpson applied to register the trademarks "O.J. Simpson," "O.J.," and "The
Juice" in the USPTO covering a variety of goods including figurines, trading
cards, sportswear, medallions, coins, and prepaid telephone cards.1 9 Simpson's
trademark applications were published for opposition in 1995 in the midst of his
criminal trial.20 William B. Ritchie filed to oppose Simpson's trademark
applications in the USPTO. In his notice of opposition, Ritchie claimed to
oppose all three trademark applications because "he disapproves of Mr.
Simpson's morality and therefore of the 'reprehensible' connotations of his
14. 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
15. Simpson was frequently referred to as the "Juice" because his initials-O.J.-were the same as
for orange juice and he was known for his energetic runs on the football field. O.j Simpson:





19. See U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 74551770 (filed July 21, 1994) (O.J. SIMPSON);
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 74551768 (filed July 21, 1994) (O.J.); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 74670836 (filed May 8, 1995) (O.J. SIMPSON); U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 74670837 (filed May 8, 1995) (THE JUICE).
20. See sources cited supra note 19.
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name."" Ritchie asserted that the marks were scandalous "because they would
'attempt to justify physical violence against women,"'" and Ritchie would be
personally damaged by the registration of the trademarks because they
disparaged his family values." The TTAB dismissed Ritchie's notice for lack of
standing, warning:
If we were to find that [Ritchie] has standing based on the allegations
in his pleading . . . . That would seem to open the way for any
individual to challenge the registration of an individual's or
corporation's trademark or service mark, where that individual . . . is
offended by the individual or corporate trademark applicant's product
or its hiring policies, political affiliation, environmental record,
advertising campaigns, etc.24
But the Federal Circuit reversed.2 ' The Federal Circuit held that, to
establish standing to oppose a trademark application under the Morality
Provision, an individual need not have a personal interest in the application
"beyond that of the general public."2 ' Because Ritchie alleged that he "belie[ved]
in a loving and nurturing relationship between husband and wife," "the marks
[at issue] are synonymous with wife-beater and wife-murderer," and he
purportedly obtained petitions signed by individuals "who agree with him that
the marks at issue are scandalous, denigrate their values, encourage spousal
abuse and minimize the problem of domestic violence," the Federal Circuit
found that Ritchie sufficiently alleged standing to oppose Simpson's trademark
applications. In allowing Ritchie's opposition to go forward, the Federal
Circuit opened the door for any member of the public who had "feelings of
moral outrage at the behavior of an applicant" to oppose a trademark application
under the Morality Provision. Simpson ultimately abandoned his applications.
Unfortunately, the TTAB's warning in Ritchie v. Simpson came true.
After Ritchie, additional cases involving moral disapproval of the trademark
owner began to appear in the TTAB. For instance, in Conkle v. Various, Inc.,29
21. Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1097 (majority opinion).
23. See Ritchie v. Simpson, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1859, 1860 (T.T.A.B. 1996), rev'd, 170 F.3d 1092.
24. Id. at 1861.
25. Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1092.
26 Id. at 1095 (quoting Ritchie, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1861).
27. Id. at 1097-98.
28. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
20:50:50 (5th ed. 2017).
29. Conkle v. Various, Inc., No. 92051587 (T.T.A.B. dismissed July 7, 2011). Please note that I
was counsel to Various, Inc. in this proceeding. All of the information in this essay comes
from publicly available information and documents.
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Various, Inc. was a social networking, online dating, and entertainment company
which operated the online dating website FriendFinder.com and more than
thirty other targeted dating and social networking sites including Amigos.com,
AsiaFriendFinder.com, SeniorFriendFinder.com, and AdultFriendFinder.com.30
Various, Inc. owned the registration for the trademark "AdultFriendFinder" for
"dating services" and "providing online chat room[s] for transmission of
messages among computer users for the purpose of users meeting other users to
encourage dating."31  Four and a half years after the USPTO registered the
trademark, James Conkle petitioned to cancel the AdultFriendFinder
registration on the ground that the services Various, Inc. offered in connection
with its mark were offensive to him and "his family and religious values and
beliefs,"32 and that he suffered "substantial emotional and mental injury as a
direct result of [his] reasonable belief that [his] children and grandchildren"
are being exposed to Various, Inc.'s services.33 Specifically, Conkle alleged in
his petition to cancel that Various, Inc.'s website promised sex to subscribing
customers, induced Internet browsers to purchase memberships in Various,
Inc.'s online "sex club," and allowed consumers "immediate access to these sex-
providing women who assertedly are ready at a moment's notice to perform a
variety of sex acts in the subscriber's own neighborhood."34 Various, Inc. moved
to dismiss Conkle's petition for lack of standing and failure to state a claim that
the trademark itself was immoral or scandalous. The TTAB denied Various,
Inc.'s motion to dismiss based on the precedent set in Ritchie v. Simpson.35
After twenty-one months of contentious proceedings and motion practices in
front of the TTAB, Conkle finally dismissed his petition with prejudice.36
A similar case involving an individual using the Morality Provision to
direct his moral outrage at the trademark owner is McDermott v. San Francisco
30. About Us, VARIOUS, http://www.various.com/about.php [https://perma.cc/523A-PRLM].
31. Petition for Cancellation at 13, ConkleNo. 92051587 (emphasis omitted),
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=92051587&pty=CAN&eno=1
[https://perma.cc/YRF4-SG381.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id at 11.
34. Id. at 7.
35. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Conkle, No.
92051587, http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=92051587&pty=CAN&eno=14
[https://perma.cc/567B-QAL2] ("[I]n accordance with the principles established in Ritchie ...
we are constrained to find that petitioner has sufficiently alleged that he has a direct and
personal interest in the outcome of this proceeding. . . ."); see also Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d
1092,1102 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
36. See Conkle, No. 92051587, http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=92051587&pty=
CAN&eno=35 [https://perma.cc/YKP8-Z5F6] (displaying the timeline of the proceedings).
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Women's Motorcycle Contingent." In McDermott, San Francisco Women's
Motorcycle Contingent (SFW]MC) applied for the trademark "Dykes On Bikes"
for the following services:
Education and Entertainment Services in the nature of organizing,
conducting, and promoting parade contingents, community festivals,
events, street fairs, forums, seminars, parties and rallies to support,
organize and motivate women motorcyclists everywhere to do the
same, thereby fostering pride in a wide variety of sexual orientations
and identities, namely lesbian, bisexual and transgender.38
SFWVMC started in 1976 when a group of twenty to twenty-five women
motorcyclists assembled at the head of the San Francisco Pride Parade.3 9 Over
the years, it has grown into a successful organization that supports philanthropic
activities in the LGBT and women's communities.4 Michael McDermott
opposed the trademark application for Dykes On Bikes under the Morality
Provision, alleging that "the mark in full is associated with a pattern of illegal
activity by the group applying for registration of the mark."41 Instead of objecting
that the trademark Dykes On Bikes was itself immoral or scandalous,
McDermott's notice of opposition plainly objected to the morality of the
trademark applicant, its activities, and its politics. For instance, in his notice
McDermott claimed that he was harmed by SFWVMC because "during the
annual illegal government supported San Francisco Dyke Hate Riot, [he] and
ALL other MALE Citizens are subject to Criminal Attack and Civil Rights
Violations committed by 'Dykes' taking part in this Anti Male Hate Riot."42
He also claimed that he was "literally FORCED FROM A CROSSWALK by
a group of 'Dykes on Bikes' who would Not let [him] cross the street because [he]
was MALE, where as they let Women Pass" and that the annual "'Dyke
Festival/March' causes harm to all citizens by creating an atmosphere and
conditions for lawlessness, particularly against Men."43 The TTAB eventually
37. 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1212(T.T.A.B. 2006), affd, 240 F. App'x 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
38. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 78281746 (filed July 31, 2003), quoted in McDermott,
81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1212.
39. Our History, DYKES ON BIKES, https://www.dykesonbikes.org/history [https://
perma.cc/2W54-85DT].
40. Dykes on Bikes, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dykes-on-Bikes [https://
perma.cc/QB6R-ZTTK]; DYKES ON BIKES, https://www.dykesonbikes.org [https://
perma.cc/8S9C-KG9P].
41. McDermott v. S.F. Women's Motorcycle Contingent, 240 F. App'x 865, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
42. Notice of Opposition at 2, McDermott, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d 1212 (No. 91169211) (errors in
original), http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91169211&pty=OPP&eno=1 [https:/
/perma.cc/W3SV-62SX].
43. Id. at 3, 5 (errors in original).
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dismissed McDermott's opposition for lack of standing, a decision subsequently
affirmed by the Federal Circuit.44 Nevertheless, this contentious proceeding
lasted over nineteen months from filing to final resolution.45
Another relevant case that is still pending in the TTAB is Smith v.
Cook Collection Attorneys, P.L.C.46 Cook Collection Attorneys, P.L.C.
("Cook Collection") is a law firm in the business of collecting judgments for
California plaintiff attorneys.47  Cook Collection's trademark
"SqueezeBloodFromTurnip.com" was registered in the USPTO on July 3,
2007.48 More than five years later, Scott Smith filed a petition in the TTAB
to cancel the trademark registration for SqueezeBloodFromTurnip.com.49 In
his petition, Smith alleged that Cook Collection used "unreasonable,
unethical and aggressive collection tactics"so to try and collect the more than
$1 million he owed by sending "numerous emails and letters to Smith," filing
"numerous publicly accessible documents in federal courts and other
government agencies against Smith . . . [that] refer to Smith as a 'debtor,"'
and making "numerous attempts to seize Smith's assets."" Smith alleged that
he was harmed by Cook Collection's SqueezeBloodFromTurnip.com
trademark because it "could cause persons suffering from high levels of stress
due to an inability to pay their debts, to 'snap' and do harm to themselves or
others," "dehumanizes persons and organizations that have fallen behind in
their financial obligations," and "unfairly characterizes all persons and
organizations that have fallen behind in their financial obligations . . . as being
'turnips,' 'the thick, fleshy, edible root of either of two plants of the mustard
family."'s2 Notwithstanding the obvious retaliatory nature of Smith's petition,
the TTAB denied Cook Collection's motion to dismiss. Five years after
initiating this proceeding in November 2012, this proceeding is still pending in
44. McDermott, 240 F. App'x at 868.
45. See id (resolving the claim initially filed February 15, 2006).
46. Smith v. Cook Collection Attorneys, P.L.C., No. 92056538 (filed Nov. 28, 2012).
47. COOK COLLECTION ATTYS, http://cookcollectionattorneys.com [https://perma.cc/6XBE-
HR88].
48. SQUEEZEBLOODFROMTURNIP.COM, Registration No. 3,257,604.
49. Petition for Cancellation, Smith, No. 92056538 (T.T.A.B. filed Nov. 28, 2012),
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=92056538&pty=CAN&eno=1
[https://perma.cc/A8XQ-B9EN].
50. Petition for Cancellation, Smith v. Cook Collection Attorneys, P.L.C., No. 92054966
(T.T.A.B. filed Dec. 20, 2011), http://ttabvue.uspto.gov /ttabvue/v?pno=92054966&pty
=CAN&eno=1 [https://perma.cc/79VF-RZD3]. This was the initial petition by Smith in an
earlier proceeding. See id.
51. Petition for Cancellation, supra note 49, at 4.
52. Id. at 5-6.
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the TTAB today with ninety-four documents on the docket." This shows
how easy it is for an individual to hold-up the legitimate trademark rights of
another by using the Morality Provision to drag a trademark owner through
years of contentious and expensive litigation in the TTAB.
III. THIS PROBLEM IS UNIQUE TO THE MORALITY PROVISION
The cases above are examples of clear overreach and abuse of trademark
law in the TTAB. These proceedings were directed at the morality of the
trademark owners or their goods and services, rather than at the trademark
itself. Unfortunately, these types of abusive proceedings are able to subsist
because of the Morality Provision's lax standing requirement, the inherent
subjectivity of the terms "immoral" and "scandalous," and the precedent
established in Ritchie v. Simpson54 that prevents the TTAB from dismissing
proceedings that dearly target a trademark owner or its goods and services and
not the trademark itself.
There is virtually no standing requirement in the TTAB to oppose or
petition to cancel a trademark under the Morality Provision, and anyone in the
United States has tanding to oppose or cancel a trademark in the USPTO based
on morality. This is unlike other provisions in Section 2 of the Trademark Act,
which typically require a party to allege that she has a real commercial interest
that would be harmed by the trademark registration" or that she possesses a
trait or characteristic implicated in the proposed trademark.6 This lax standing
requirement is not the Morality Provision's only flaw. The Morality Provision is
also an inherently subjective law in which the standard to determine whether a
mark is immoral or scandalous is so vague that even trademarks with innocuous
dictionary definitions could, theoretically, be broadly interpreted to be immoral
or scandalous to certain members of the population. Indeed, trademarks that
may seem immoral or scandalous to some may be entirely innocent to others.
Trademarks that may have been considered immoral or scandalous in the past
may be perfectly acceptable today. These unique characteristics of the Morality
Provision allow abusive proceedings to continue in the TTAB for years, resulting
53. See Smith v. Cook Collection Attorneys, P.L.C., No. 92056538 (filed Nov.28, 2012).
54. 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
55. For instance, Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act requires a party to assert that the proposed
trademark is likely to cause confusion with his registered trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)
(2012).
56. For instance, Section 2(a)'s disparagement provision required a party to assert that he
possesses a trait or characteristic that is clearly and directly implicated in the proposed
trademark. Id. § 1052(a).
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in inconsistent and arbitrary outcomes. For instance, based on the cases
previously discussed, a self-proclaimed conservative Christian family man could
drag Planned Parenthood through years of protracted proceedings in the
TTAB by filing petitions to cancel Planned Parenthood's trademarks under
the Morality Provision because they offend "his family and religious values
and beliefs" and inflict upon him "substantial emotional and mental injury as
a direct result of his reasonable belief that his children and grandchildren""
are exposed to Planned Parenthood's services and trademarks. Similarly, an
environmental activist could petition to cancel British Petroleum's trademark
registration for "BP" because she disapproves of BPs morality, its handling of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and of the "reprehensible connotations"" of the BP
mark. Even though trademark owners may ultimately prevail on the merits in
these proceedings, trademark owners are still forced to expend valuable time,
resources, and expense defending their trademarks from these overreaching
attacks. These proceedings thus hold up legitimate commercial activities by
dragging trademark owners through years of contentious proceedings in the
TTAB.
IV. THE MORALITY PROVISION Is FLAWED
As commentators have explored at the USPTO examination phase, the
Morality Provision results in inconsistency, allowing some trademarks to be
registered while denying other trademarks with the same immoral or scandalous
term.59 As the Federal Circuit is exploring in In re Brunetti,"o the Morality
Provision is likely to be found an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech.
Indeed, as the U.S. Supreme Court found in Matal v. Tam,61 trademarks are
private speech subject to the protections of the First Amendment, and they
cannot be refused registration because they may be offensive to certain segments
of the population." Finally, as this Essay has exposed, because of its overly
liberal standing requirement, its admittedly vague and highly subjective
standard, and unsound precedent, the Morality Provision is often used as a tool
for abuse in the TTAB. These characteristics of the Morality Provision provide
an all-too-easy platform for intermeddling third parties to intrude into
57. Petition for Cancellation, supra note 31, at 3, 11.
58. Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1102 (Newman, J., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted).
59. See supra note 5.
60. No. 15-1109 (Fed. Cir. argued Aug. 29, 2017).
61. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
62. See id.
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legitimate commercial trademark rights of others based on moral disapproval
of a trademark owner, its business, activities or politics, instead of the
trademark itself. For these reasons, the Morality Provision is clearly flawed.
Trademark law is not the appropriate vehicle to attempt to legislate,
regulate, or influence morals of society, nor does it have the "legal right, moral
authority, social responsibility, or judgmental power, to intrude into commercial
trademark rights based on moral disapproval of the trademark owner."63
Providing a platform for third parties to file these abusive proceedings then
allowing them to drag on for years in the TTAB creates a loss of confidence in
the trademark administrative process, overextends trademark law's
jurisprudence and the TTAB's authority, drains government and commercial
resources, and forces legitimate businesses to spend time and resources
defending against frivolous attacks on their commercial trademark rights. This
problem is unique to the Morality Provision and is just another reason why
the flawed Morality Provision must be overhauled or removed from
trademark law.
63. Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1102 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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